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reform international institutions like the 
United Nations and the World Bank. 
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RITA ABRAHAMSEN 
Dependency 
Theories of dependency challenged the 
dominance of modernization strategies 
in the mid- to late twentieth century. 
Modernization strategies mapped path-
ways to modernity for Third World states 
based on the use of external agents for 
change. Dependency analysts declared 
such agents exploitative. Without auton-
omous economic growth, Third World 
societies could expect no change in their 
economic fortunes. The result, so 
dependency theorists argued, could 
never be modernization or development, 
only underdevelopment. 
Dependency's language of neocolo-
niai denial proved extremely influential 
during the 1960s and 1970s and con-
tributed to international efforts to trans-
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form unequal trading relationships (see 
neocolonialism). But not ail dependency 
theorists regarded exchange as the cause 
of underdevelopment. Others stressed 
exploitative internai relations of produc-
tion instead. The debate robbed depen-
dency of its theoretical unanimity. By the 
1980s, the rise of newly industrializing 
countries in the Third World appeared to 
rob it also of its universality (see newly 
industrializing country). Dependency 
and modernization, critics declared, were 
simply two sides of the same coin. Both 
focused on national solutions and both 
were il! equipped to counter the growing 
influence of new globalization strategies 
at the end of the twentieth century. 
Certainly dependency theories derived 
from the sa me postwar global landscape 
that bred theories of modernization. In 
industrial SOCietles state-based Key-
nesian initiatives, which provided citi-
zens access to education, housing, 
health services and work, replaced the 
divisive bitterness and destruction of 
prewar strategies. Within the space of a 
single generation, industrial societies 
were transformed and the consumerism 
of empowered citizens became the 
means to achieve sustainable growth. 
But in the Third World no similar 
domestic focus existed. Colonialism had 
denied people both the opportunity and 
capacity for self-governance. Above ail it 
had denied them the empowerment that 
invariably flowed from domestically 
focused wealth generation, and left them 
dependent on external demand to gen-
erate growth. It never permitted them the 
opportunity to achieve the same degree 
of economic autonomy enjoyed by the 
first world. 
Although aspirations for self-reliance 
had been inherently dangerous for pre-
war industrial states, they remained cen-
trai to most Third World national agendas. 
However, aspirations alone could not 
transform dependency. Most Third World 
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states remained producers of cheap labor 
and raw materials dependent on the 
health of distant markets. They never 
reinvented their economies drawing on 
the strength of thei r own domestic needs. 
These realities informed the central theses 
of early dependency theorists. Continued 
dependency and unequal exchange, they 
argued, produced neocolonialism not 
liberation, underdevelopment not devel-
opment. 
This simple argument made the notion 
of dependency extremely attractive as a 
way of accounting for the inability of 
many former colonies to transform 
themselves into democratic consumption-
based societies, the goal of moderniza-
tion. Not only had colonialism system-
atically underdeveloped their capabilities, 
it also left their internai economic sectors 
bereft of overall coherence. Each sector 
existed separately to meet external 
demand. 
Some dependency theorists argued 
that this vast developmental gap 
between internai sectors bestowed on 
states a centrality no longer possessed in 
the first world. In newly independent 
Africa, local elites quickly seized control 
of these states to maintain their privi-
leges. Linkages with foreign owned 
enterprises similarly strengthened their 
status. Since most elites depended also 
on fragile political and economic bases 
to maintain their access to state resour-
ces, they quickly learned to exploit 
regional, ethnie, religious or tribal dif-
ferences to their advantage. Unfortu-
nately these strategies did little for 
national development. Nations frag-
mented, capitalist classes failed to flour-
ish, poverty and dependency worsened. 
South America's solution to foreign 
dependency lay with import substitution. 
But its leaders also benefited from the 
status quo. They were reluctant to intro-
duce the necessary packages for land 
reform, income redistribution and poli-
tical change that successful indus-
trialization required. Consequently 
import substitution never generated suf-
ficient internai market growth to remove 
industry's dependence on foreign mar-
kets. Nor did it prevent the penetration 
of transnational capital keen to take 
advantage of protected markets or to 
exploit for export purposes the internai 
colonial relationships that industry relied 
upon to remain competitive. 
Supporters of modernization blamed 
this situation on internai obstacles to 
development, not foreign domination. 
Tradition and the lack of entrepreneurial 
spirit determined the backwardness of 
rural sectors and prevented their integra-
tion with modern urban sectors, which 
had no choice but to turn to foreign 
markets in order to grow. Dependency 
theorists disagreed. When the indus-
trialized world created colonial econo-
mies, they conserved only those pre-
capitalist social formations functional to 
capitalism. This created an impression of 
duality, of contradictory modern and 
traditional sectors. In reality traditional 
sectors were integral to the survival of the 
modern economy. They were not sepa-
rate from it, although the nature of their 
integration differed from rural sectors in 
the first world. In that difference lay dis-
advantage and underdevelopment, not 
empowerment and autonomy. 
Many consequences flowed from this 
lack of internai coherence. It created 
internai colonial relationships that dif-
ferentiated town and country. It enabled 
modern urban sectors to remain globally 
relevant only by exploiting rural sectors 
as a cheap resource. Such unequal 
internai relationships kept wages low, 
reduced political pressures for reform 
and made development difficult. At the 
same time they sharpened uneven 
development and social conflict. 
However, the dependency idea that 
the experience of colonialism most 
explained differences between first and 
Third Worlds, provided elites with a 
convenient scapegoat. The Third World's 
numerical dominance of most interna-
tional fora by the 1970s also provided 
post-colonial leaders with an opportunity 
to create a powerful new Third World 
bloc to address these historical legacies 
and lobby for global reform (see post-
colonialism). A Non-aligned Movement 
(1955) attempted to create Third World 
solidarity. A United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development in 1964 
sought a Third World alternative to the 
first world's think tank, the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD). Both organizations 
demanded a New International Eco-
nomic Order (1975) and a redistribution of 
first world surpluses to the Third World. 
No new order materialized. The only 
surpluses redistributed were petrodollars 
that arrived as cheap loans of dubious 
value. By the 1980s the cost of servicing 
debt negated any gains made during 
preceding decades. Although the Eur-
opean Community and the United States 
did improve terms of trade, their actions 
affected only small groupings of Third 
World countries and only a narrow range 
of commodities. Moreover these efforts 
to address unequal exchange promoted 
foreign rather than domestic markets as 
the basis for economic growth. They 
reinforced arguments that dependency 
and modernization theories were simply 
two sides of the same coin. Indeed, as 
globalization intensified towards the end 
of the twentieth century, debates con-
cerning dependency withered. Civil 
society organizations developed alter-
native localized programs for commu-
nit y capacity building instead. In East 
Asia, states successfully transformed 
export-Ied strategies into domestic 
growth. Colonial pasts were not always 
the absolute constraint that dependency 
analysts had suggested. Thus the political 
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significance of dependency also abated 
over time. 
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Desertification 
Degradation of formerly productive land 
in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid 
areas due to climatic variation (e.g. pro-
longed drought or flooding) and/or 
unsustainable human activity, associated 
primarily with food production. While 
the standard view of desertification con-
jures up images of advancing desert sand 
dunes, the reality is complex and spora-
dico Consequently, desertification is not 
confined to desert fringe areas such as 
the Sahel region of Africa and western 
Rajasthan in India. To date, significant 
land degradation has also occurred in 
the United States (30 per cent of land), 
Latin America and the Caribbean (one 
quarter is now desert or dry land), China 
(loss of 700,000 hectares of arable land) 
and Europe (e.g. one fifth of land in Spain 
is under threat). Current estimates sug-
gest that this problem affects approxi-
mately one third of the earth's land 
surface (four billion hectares), impacting 
